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THE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S PIN: UNTANGLING FREE
SPEECH REGULATION IN THE COURTROOM
Michael Kagan*
I. A FIRST AMENDMENT FAULT LINE
On a Tuesday morning in September 2016, Erika Ballou, a deputy
public defender in Clark County, Nevada, appeared with her client for a
sentencing hearing in a Las Vegas courtroom.1 She wore a black pin on her
lapel. “Black Lives Matter,” it said.2 District Court Judge Douglas Herndon
told her to either take it off or hand her case over to another attorney from
the public defender’s office.3 Ballou refused and asked the judge to instead
recuse himself from her cases. Her boss, Clark County Public Defender
Phil Kohn, stood at her side and insisted she should be allowed to wear the
pin.4
A few days earlier, the Las Vegas Police Protective Association, the
main police union in the city, had written a letter to the chief judge of the
district court complaining about defense attorneys wearing the pin in court.5
Judge Herndon, who had been endorsed by the police union during his
election campaigns,6 said that he was simply asking that attorneys “leave
any kind of political or opinion protest statements outside the
courtroom. . . . Wear it in the hallway. Wear it in front of the courthouse.”7
Ms. Ballou insisted that she was acting within her First Amendment
rights and argued that she was unfairly being treated differently from Clark
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County prosecutors—who wear office-issued lapel pins—and uniformed
court marshals, who had been allowed to wear black bands commemorating
police killed in the line of duty.8 Judge Herndon adjourned the sentencing
hearing. Two days later, they reconvened. Ms. Ballou agreed to remove her
pin. Instead, she wore a black arm band, and was flanked by nearly two
dozen colleagues who wore both the arm bands and Black Lives Matter
pins.9
Ms. Ballou was not the first. Earlier in 2016, Ohio defense attorney
Andrea Burton settled a contempt of court case against her that began when
she wore a Black Lives Matter pin to court.10 She told journalists that, as
part of the settlement, she agreed not to wear the pin inside the courtroom
on the condition that police be prohibited from wearing black bands on
their badges commemorating slain officers.11 In that case, the judge told a
television reporter, “[t]here’s a difference between a flag, a pin from your
church or the Eagles and having a pin that’s on a political issue.”12
The Black Lives Matter pin cases expose a fault line in First
Amendment law. The Supreme Court has never fully resolved the question
of whether speech in court is free speech for First Amendment purposes.
The Court has found that lawyers may advertise their services to the public,
subject to reasonable regulation.13 And the Court has found that lawyers
enjoy constitutional protection for out-of-court political speech critical of
the legal system.14 But these cases did not deal directly with attorney
expression in the courtroom. Some lower courts have rejected claims that
lawyers’ communications in the courtroom enjoy any First Amendment
protection at all.15 But their reasoning has been muddled, and the judges
have been divided. It is not clear how they would treat the specific facts
that arose in Las Vegas.
In this brief Essay, I outline the reasons why free speech in the
courtroom remains somewhat uncharted territory in First Amendment law.
Using the Las Vegas Black Lives Matter pin case as an example, I argue
for a way to resolve the inherent tension between free speech and the need
to maintain order and fairness in the court. Under my proposed solution,
judges would be able to impose certain limitations on courtroom speech but
could not engage in viewpoint discrimination. Judges should be especially
cautious about imposing special restrictions on speech that they regard as
8
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David Ferrara, Lawyers Pack Courtroom in Support of ‘Black Lives Matter’ Movement, LAS
VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (Sept. 22, 2016, 12:10 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/lasvegas/lawyers-pack-courtroom-support-black-lives-matter-movement [https://perma.cc/9PB9-Z73L].
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See Amanda Smith, Atty. Refuses to Remove Black Lives Matter Pin, Taken into Custody,
WKBN (July 22, 2016, 11:49 AM), http://wkbn.com/2016/07/22/attorney-jailed-for-refusing-to-takeoff-black-lives-matter-button/ (including video) [https://perma.cc/8EVL-4M3W].
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Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) [https://perma.cc/9AUA-M7P2].
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Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1032–33 (1991) [https://perma.cc/X48C-S2VR].
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more controversial. Instead, judges who are concerned about extraneous
expression in their courtroom need to hew carefully to a neutral approach,
applicable to controversial symbols as well as seemingly innocuous speech.
II. THE TROUBLE WITH SPEECH IN THE COURTROOM
Perhaps the most famous Supreme Court case involving free speech in
a courthouse is Cohen v. California.16 In that 1971 case, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutional right of Paul Robert Cohen to wear “a jacket
bearing the words ‘Fuck the Draft’” in the corridor outside of a
courtroom.17 But while this free expression occurred in a courthouse, it did
not force the Court to address judges’ authority to restrict speech inside the
courtroom. Moreover, the Supreme Court refused to treat Mr. Cohen’s case
as a question of courthouse decorum because he was punished under a
broad statute that was applicable everywhere in California.18
The only direct guidance that the Supreme Court has offered about
courtroom speech came in another case that, like Ms. Ballou’s, originated
in Las Vegas. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, a 1991 case about lawyer
free speech, the Supreme Court found that an attorney could not be
sanctioned for publicly criticizing misconduct within the criminal justice
system.19 But the lawyer in that case made his critical statements at a press
conference a few hours after his client was indicted.20 Like Mr. Cohen, he
did not make the statements in the courtroom. However, the Gentile Court
did say, in dicta, that “in the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding,
whatever right to ‘free speech’ an attorney has is extremely
circumscribed.”21 Therein lies the problem. Does “extremely
circumscribed” mean that an attorney has no free speech rights in court at
all? Or does it mean that a careful balance must be struck?
Other than the brief dicta in Gentile, the Supreme Court has never
clearly explained how we should think about the courtroom as a context for
speech. This is a problem because modern free speech law has become
extensively focused on categorizing the nature of the forum in which
speech occurs in order to determine if and how government may regulate
it.22 The Supreme Court has created three main categories of forums for
16

403 U.S. 15 (1971) [https://perma.cc/43LP-62QK].
Id. at 16 (quoting the decision of the California Court of Appeals, 81 Cal. Rptr. 503, 505 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1969)).
18
Id. at 19.
19
501 U.S. at 1034–35 (“There is no question that speech critical of the exercise of the State’s
power lies at the very center of the First Amendment. Nevada seeks to punish the dissemination of
information relating to alleged governmental misconduct . . . . The judicial system, and in particular our
criminal justice courts, play a vital part in a democratic state, and the public has a legitimate interest in
their operations.”).
20
Id. at 1033.
21
Id. at 1071.
22
See Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 647, 652
(2010) (“With so much hinging on the label, litigation routinely arises over whether a court should
deem a particular location a public forum (where only content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions are allowed) or a nonpublic forum (where a vast array of restrictions are allowed if they are
viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum).” (footnote omitted)); Robert C.
17
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free speech purposes: the public forum, the nonpublic forum, and the
limited public forum, with the most confusion surrounding the limited
public forum.23
In very brief terms, free speech rights are at their apex in a traditional
public forum, of which the National Mall is the ideal type.24 By contrast,
the government has more latitude to restrict speech in nonpublic fora,
including on government property.25 An obvious example would be a
government office building, where public employees are supposed to
conduct the regular work of government agencies. If protestors enter, say, a
veterans’ hospital and begin to shout slogans, the First Amendment does
not prevent an official from ordering them to stop and forcibly removing
them if necessary. Protestors could of course picket outside on the
sidewalk, but they do not have a constitutional right to speak inside. This
seems to be the logic behind Judge Herndon’s statement that the pin could
be worn in the hallway or outside the court, but not inside the court
hearing.
Yet, a court is not entirely closed to the public the way some
government offices are. It might be closer to the third category, the limited
public fora. The Court has explained that a limited public forum is
“reserv[ed] . . . for certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics.”26
Consider, for illustration, a public municipal board meeting. In this context,
government officials can restrict speech quite a bit, for instance by only
allowing public comment at a designated time and requiring speakers to
limit their statements in duration. Such rules are necessary to allow public
bodies to function. But it would be considerably different if, say, a school
board only allowed public comment from people who favored a particular
bond issue or property tax increase. The Supreme Court has addressed this
problem by holding that in limited public fora, authorities can regulate the
form and subject matter of speech, but may not discriminate based on
viewpoint:
Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he wishes to
address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum, or if he is
not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum
was created, the government violates the First Amendment when it denies

Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA
L. REV. 1713, 1731–44 (1987) (tracing the development of the Court’s distinction between public and
nonpublic fora).
23
See Caplan, supra note 22, at 654 (discussing the Court’s shifting use of the term). The
taxonomy can become more complicated, because a public forum can come in at least two varieties. It
can be a “traditional public forum,” which has traditionally been held in trust for public use, or it can be
a “designated public forum” that the government intentionally opens for that purpose even if it is not
traditionally considered to be a public forum. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015) [https://perma.cc/6JJV-8XU7].
24
ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) [https://perma.cc/BA2D-J5LJ].
25
See Caplan, supra note 22, at 651.
26
Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (alteration in original) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) [https://perma.cc/YGS7-YE6M]).
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access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an
otherwise includible subject.27

This principle of viewpoint neutrality would seem to support Ballou’s
argument that if police can wear arm bands commemorating violence
against police while they are in a courtroom, she ought to be able wear a
pin protesting violence by police against people of color.
III. LOWER COURT RESISTANCE
At least three federal circuits have rejected claims that lawyers’
expression in the courtroom enjoys First Amendment protection. Two of
these cases produced split decisions, and the colorful circumstances of each
case help illustrate why judges may be troubled by lawyers’ courtroom
expression.
A. Berner v. Delahanty
Of these three cases, one seems especially similar to Erika Ballou’s
dispute with Judge Herndon because it also involved a button. In Berner v.
Delahanty, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered the case of
a Maine lawyer, Seth Berner, who in late October 1995 appeared in Judge
Thomas Delahanty’s courtroom wearing a button opposing an anti-LGBT
initiative on the Maine ballot.28 His button said, “No on 1—Maine Won’t
Discriminate.”29 Judge Delahanty told him to remove it because “the
courtroom is not a political forum.”30 The First Circuit unanimously agreed:
A courtroom’s very function is to provide a locus in which civil and criminal
disputes can be adjudicated. . . .
. . . Emblems of political significance worn by attorneys in the courtroom as
a means of espousing personal political opinions can reasonably be thought
to compromise the environment of impartiality and fairness to which every
jurist aspires. As an officer of the court, a lawyer’s injection of private
political viewpoints into the courtroom, coupled with the judge’s toleration
of such conduct, necessarily tarnishes the veneer of political imperviousness
that ideally should cloak a courtroom, especially when the partisan
sentiments are completely unrelated to the court’s business.31

The First Circuit reasoned that a lawyer compromises a courtroom’s
“cloak” of impartiality by injecting political speech into a proceeding. But
is the problem that Mr. Berner’s button was “political,” or that it was
“completely unrelated” to court business? It seems to me that the latter
better justifies the First Circuit’s decision, and might explain the court’s

27

See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (citations omitted)
[https://perma.cc/24YB-T6MM]; see also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829 (calling viewpoint
discrimination “an egregious form of content discrimination” from which the government is forbidden
“even when the limited public forum is one of its own creation”).
28
129 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1997) [https://perma.cc/48EK-3672].
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 26–27.
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unanimity.32 Telling him to remove the button was arguably little different
from telling someone in the audience to be quiet, or telling a lawyer to not
discuss irrelevancies in an argument.
Despite her case’s superficial similarity to Mr. Berner’s, Ms. Ballou
advanced three means of differentiating her speech from Mr. Berner’s. She
told Judge Herndon that her pin was not supporting or opposing a candidate
on the ballot (nor a ballot measure, for that matter).33 She argued that
“Black Lives Matter” referred to “an issue about criminal justice.”34 And,
most importantly, she pointed to the fact that police are permitted to wear
symbolic bands in court to suggest that her pin was being singled out for its
particular message.35 In other words, she asserted the judge’s ruling
amounted to viewpoint discrimination. These are rebuttable points, to be
sure. A lawyer in a sentencing hearing does not necessarily have the
latitude to raise any issue that can be related in some manner to criminal
justice. Moreover, even if the content of the speech is permissible, a rule of
order might require lawyers to make their arguments on the record, rather
than through visual signs, symbols, and the like. But once a judge allows
some symbolic visual expression in speech, it becomes much harder to
justify restricting others.
B. Zal v. Steppe
In 1992, a Ninth Circuit panel issued a split decision on a case
involving Cyrus Zal, an antiabortion lawyer from California. Zal had defied
a ban on talking about abortion during a trial of a pro-life protestor.36 The
trial judge ordered Zal to avoid using a list of fifty words and phrases, such
as “killing centers,” “infanticide,” “fetus,” “abortion,” and
“extermination.”37 Zal disregarded the banned word list repeatedly, and by
the end of the trial the judge had cited him for contempt twenty times.38 Zal
cited the First Amendment in his defense.39
Two of the three judges on the appellate panel, Judge Farris and Judge
Trott, rejected Zal’s First Amendment challenge outright.40 They relied on
the dicta from Gentile and an older Supreme Court case stating that, when a
lawyer disagrees with a trial judge’s decision, he may preserve the issue for
appeal but may not otherwise disrupt the court or resist the judge’s
authority.41 In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Noonan noted
that the Supreme Court had previously struck down a contempt citation for

32

Id. at 22.
See Ritter, supra note 1.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1992) [https://perma.cc/9DQ4-3P94].
37
Id.
38
Id. at 926.
39
Id. at 927.
40
Id.; id. at 930 (Trott, J., concurring).
41
Id. at 927–28 (citing Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991); Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1952) [https://perma.cc/45B5-8ETR]).
33
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inflamed language used by a pro se defendant.42 Judge Noonan thought that
this meant that trial judges must grant “broad latitude” for abusive language
in court.43 He wrote that “[i]t would be ironic if the Constitution failed to
protect its professional defenders—the lawyers—in the very forum
dedicated to the Constitution’s doctrine.”44 Judge Noonan quoted an earlier
Ninth Circuit decision where the court of appeals said, “attorneys and other
trial participants do not lose their constitutional rights at the courthouse
door.”45 But despite that broad phraseology, that prior case dealt with
restrictions on attorneys talking to the media, rather than on speech in the
courtroom.46
In response, Judge Trott insisted that the First Amendment did not
apply at all in courtrooms because they are not public fora.47 He thought
that to bring the First Amendment into the courtroom would essentially
turn judicial order into chaos:
Does a juror have a First Amendment right to speak or to examine
witnesses? Does a court reporter have a right to editorialize during closing
arguments? May spectators chafe, chant, and cheer? Could an anti-abortion
advocate appear and deliver a right-to-life speech to the jury about to
deliberate on the charges against Zal’s clients? I would think not.48

Like the First Circuit, Judge Trott worried about extending First
Amendment protection to courtroom settings. But the dicta in Gentile may
not go quite to the extreme position that Judge Trott articulated. Gentile
explicitly states that free speech in the courtroom is “circumscribed,” but it
does not say it is nonexistent.49 Judge Trott missed the point when he said,
“[a]lthough courtrooms have always been devoted to debate, they have
never been devoted to free debate, but only to debate within the confines
set by the trial judge and the rule of law.”50 The answer is not to dismiss the
idea that the First Amendment applies to courtrooms, but to focus on how
to apply it in a way that protects decorum and prevents viewpoint
discrimination.
C. Mezibov v. Allen
The third relevant court of appeals case involved Marc D. Mezibov, a
criminal defense attorney in Ohio, and his dispute with a local prosecutor,
Michael K. Allen.51 During a criminal trial, Mezibov made multiple
42

Id. at 935 (Noonan, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part) (citing In re Little,
404 U.S. 553 (1972) (per curiam) [https://perma.cc/4NV2-ML83]).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 934–35.
45
Id. at 934 (quoting Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th
Cir. 1985) [https://perma.cc/YN8X-WFF5]).
46
Levine, 764 F.2d at 592.
47
Zal, 968 F.2d at 932 (Trott, J., concurring) (“Traditional First Amendment analysis also supports
the idea that lawyers (and others) have no First Amendment right to speak freely in a courtroom.”).
48
Id.
49
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1071 (1991).
50
Zal, 968 F.2d at 932 (Trott, J., concurring).
51
Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 715 (6th Cir. 2005).
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motions to have Allen disqualified from the case, which the trial judge
rejected.52 Mezibov’s client was ultimately convicted, after which Allen
told the local press that Mezibov “is a man who doesn’t try too many cases
and the verdict shows that. If I were [the defendant], I would ask for my
money back.”53 Mezibov responded by filing a Section 198354 suit against
Allen, alleging that he had defamed him under color of law in retaliation
for filing motions in court.55 In support of his argument that Allen was
using the power of the state to retaliate against him for protected speech in
court, he cited the Ninth Circuit’s “courthouse door” line that Judge
Noonan also echoed.56
In Mezibov v. Allen, all three Sixth Circuit judges agreed that Mezibov
could show no real injury because “a criminal defense attorney of ordinary
firmness would not have been chilled” by a prosecutor’s public criticism.57
But they split over the applicability of the First Amendment. Judge Siler
and Judge Batchelder, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Zal,
concluded that courtrooms are nonpublic forums and that “we regularly
countenance the application of even viewpoint-discriminatory restrictions
on speech.”58 They cited rules of procedure and evidence banning lawyers
from discussing irrelevant or prejudicial topics during trial.59 This drew
Judge Moore’s dissent:
By stating that the First Amendment has no place in the courtroom, the
majority . . . betrays the historical role of litigation as providing a forum for
the expression of core political speech, instead relegating attorney speech to
a level heretofore occupied only by such speech as obscenity and fighting
words. . . .
....
. . . Far from seeing the courtroom as a place where the First Amendment
would “intrude,” I view the courtroom as a place where freedom of
expression should be embraced and exercised with vigor.60

Judge Moore was right to be alarmed at entirely exempting
courtrooms from First Amendment protection. Because courts are not
stereotypical traditional public fora, and because judges clearly must
control their courtrooms, it is tempting to rule out any place for the First
Amendment in courtrooms. But this simplistic approach impairs the central
role attorneys play in our system of government. The American Bar
52

Id.
Id.
54
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) [https://perma.cc/3AYU-Q8T7].
55
Mezibov, 411 F.3d at 716.
56
Id. at 718 (quoting Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th
Cir. 1985)).
57
Id. at 715; id. at 726 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with the
majority opinion that Allen’s speech would not “deter a criminal defense attorney of ordinary firmness
from” advocating for “his or her client”).
58
Id. at 718.
59
Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 404(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 11; and FED. R. APP. P. 34, 38).
60
Id. at 724, 726 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
53
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Association says that a lawyer is “a public citizen having special
responsibility for the quality of justice.”61 Echoing this sentiment, the
Supreme Court has described the role of attorneys in a democracy in
grandiose terms:
One does not have to inhale the self-adulatory bombast of after-dinner
speeches to affirm that all the interests of man that are comprised under the
constitutional guarantees given to “life, liberty and property” are in the
professional keeping of lawyers. It is a fair characterization of the lawyer’s
responsibility in our society that he stands “as a shield” . . . in defense of
right and to ward off wrong.62

Lawyers play a bedrock role in protecting the values written into our
constitutional form of government. It is entirely foreseeable that if lawyers
defend right and prevent wrong in our system of justice, they might
occasionally ruffle a judge’s feathers or express something that seems
controversial. In those situations, viewpoint neutral First Amendment
protection for lawyers only strengthens a courtroom’s “veneer of political
imperviousness.”63
IV. THE STRUGGLE FOR NEUTRALITY
The First Amendment should protect a lawyer’s political speech in a
courtroom, albeit with considerable restrictions that are necessary for
courts to perform their adjudicative functions. The best reading of the
Supreme Court case law in this area sees courts as highly specialized,
limited public fora. Speech may thus be circumscribed, as the Court said in
Gentile, but that does not mean that the First Amendment has no place.
Speech in court is highly regulated by the rules of court procedure, rules of
evidence, and by the need to maintain order and decorum. But it would go
too far to say, as some lower court judges have, that free speech stops at the
courthouse gate.64 By way of illustration, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
defended litigants’ freedom to make arguments in court to which judges
take offense.65 The Court has clarified that a judge’s desire to maintain
order must not impede lawyers’ ability to argue for their clients.66
Because courts are limited public fora, the government (usually in the
person of the judge) may regulate the form and subject matter of speech in

61

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) [https://perma.cc/35JNR7KG].
62
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(citation omitted) [https://perma.cc/V49R-5L65].
63
Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 1997).
64
Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (“It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”) [https://perma.cc/LAT8-5T72].
65
See In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972) (per curiam); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136
(1965) [https://perma.cc/KS39-CQXU]; In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962)
[https://perma.cc/N9CG-2P8U]. These cases have been decided on due process or statutory grounds, but
they reflect latent free speech values as well.
66
McConnell, 370 U.S. at 236.

133

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

courtrooms, but may not discriminate based on viewpoint.67 Considering
this, the simplest and most defensible way for a court to prevent politically
provocative symbols from appearing on clothing in court is to prohibit any
expressive symbol of any kind from being worn by lawyers or court
personnel. A court could, for example, allow only expression permitted by
the rules of court. Were this the practice in Las Vegas, prohibiting Black
Lives Matter pins would be easily defensible against a First Amendment
challenge.
But once courts begin to allow some expressive clothing—a breast
cancer awareness ribbon, or even a symbol of allegiance to an NFL team—
prohibiting a Black Lives Matter pin becomes more problematic as it
appears to be a form of viewpoint discrimination. If it were to be justified,
it would likely have to be on the grounds that the slogan “Black Lives
Matter” is particularly controversial.
There is some precedent for a controversial speech exception in
limited public fora, but it is not clear to what extent the Supreme Court
stands by this exception.68 As a starting point, the idea that controversial
expression might be subject to special restrictions is inherently problematic
because the First Amendment exists precisely to protect less popular
speech, which is more likely to be considered controversial.69 If there is an
exception for controversial speech, this possibility seems to be commonly
invoked to restrict political activism by African-Americans, given that the
case on point involved a restriction on the activities of the NAACP.70
Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court decisions that protected Christian
speakers against viewpoint discrimination despite the controversial nature
of their speech seem to undermine the controversial speech exception.71 In
one of the Court’s more recent cases involving religious speech, the Court
explicitly said in dicta that it would be specifically impermissible in a
limited public forum for a government agency to exclude particular

67

See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985) (permitting the
exclusion of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from the
Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), which solicits donations from federal employees, because the
exclusion is “reasonable”).
69
See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
(1991) (summarizing the First Amendment’s strong protection of speech even when society finds the
expression “offensive or disagreeable” (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990)))
[https://perma.cc/ZJ45-5P56].
70
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813 (“We conclude that the Government does not violate the First
Amendment when it limits participation in the CFC in order to minimize disruption to the federal
workplace, to ensure the success of the fund-raising effort, or to avoid the appearance of political
favoritism without regard to the viewpoint of the excluded groups.”).
71
See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07, 114–15 (2001)
(reiterating strict viewpoint neutrality as the rule in limited public fora, without any evident exception
for controversial viewpoints) [https://perma.cc/4YV9-FNAF]; cf. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 899 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s “holding
amounts to a significant reformulation of our viewpoint discrimination precedents and will significantly
expand access to limited-access forums,” and citing Cornelius as representing a different, earlier
approach).
68
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viewpoints about “racism.”72 This should cause judges to be cautious about
imposing special restrictions on expression that seems controversial.
In short, this is dicey territory for a court. In Las Vegas, Judge
Herndon told Ms. Ballou that he thought the Black Lives Matter pin was an
attack on the court.73 Offended as he might be, “[j]udges are supposed to be
[people] of fortitude.”74 They must “guard against confusing offenses to
their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice.”75
Moreover, lawyers, especially criminal defense attorneys, are supposed to
raise issues that may make many people uncomfortable. They are not
supposed to pretend that all is fine with our system of law enforcement if
they do not believe that to be the case.
Clearly, a balance must be struck. Perhaps lawyers may be granted
more leeway in a hearing in front of a judge, but must be more circumspect
when standing before a jury.76 Perhaps a judge would be on solid ground to
disallow an especially large or visually distracting pin. But the Black Lives
Matter pin that Erika Ballou wore was small and simple, with plain white
letters on a black background. It attracts attention only because of its
message, which is critical of police violence and possibly (in Judge
Herndon’s view) of some judges. And there’s the rub. There is something
especially unseemly about an elected judge who depends on police support
in his campaigns singling out a defense attorney’s pin containing a message
police dislike and ordering it removed. It may have happened in the
courtroom, but the First Amendment still applies. Black Lives Matter is a
deliberately provocative movement and message. But a judge should only
restrict its expression in a manner that does not violate the First
Amendment’s strict prohibition on viewpoint discrimination in limited
public fora.

72

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831 (“Our understanding of the complex and multifaceted nature of
public discourse has not embraced such a contrived description of the marketplace of ideas. If the topic
of debate is, for example, racism, then exclusion of several views on that problem is just as offensive to
the First Amendment as exclusion of only one. It is as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an
atheistic perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic,
or social viewpoint.”).
73
Ritter, supra note 1 (“The pin, the judge said, ‘is making a political statement, that, “I wear this
in protest of how the court is treating minority defendants.”’”).
74
In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972) (per curiam) (quoting Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376
(1947) [https://perma.cc/LB9N-CRCP]).
75
Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958) [https://perma.cc/K6M7-UY3R]).
76
See Juhl & Ferrara, supra note 5 (noting that Ms. Ballou’s supervisor, Clark County Public
Defender Phil Kohn, said no one from his office would wear the pin in front of a jury).
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